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If heads do not roll, nobody makes any changes.1
A Introduction
The Financial Crisis, which began in the United States on Wall Street in the fall
of 2008, cost the global economy trillions of dollars, caused millions of peo-
ple to lose their jobs, homes, life and retirement savings, and resulted in the
collapse or taxpayer-funded government bailout of several century-old, storied
financial institutions. Irresponsible risk-taking, fraudulent mortgage and lend-
ing practices, and misrepresentations around increasingly complex products are
among the many theories that have been put forth as to what caused the Fi-
nancial Crisis. Importantly, there are numerous state and federal statutes on
the books prohibiting and criminalizing such activity. To put away those who
engaged in such criminal behavior, Wall Street-focused prosecutors just had to
† J.D., University of Notre Dame Law School.
The author formerly worked for Morgan Stanley from 2011 to 2013 and the Securities and Ex-
change Commission’s Division of Enforcement in the summer of 2014. While at the Commission,
the author had the opportunity to work closely with cooperators and whistleblowers while assisting
in the investigation of possible violations of the federal securities laws. The views expressed herein
are the author’s own.
1 Investigating and Prosecuting Financial Fraud After the Fraud Enforcement and Recov-
ery Act: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Sen.
Charles E. Grassley), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg71990/html/
CHRG-111shrg71990.htm; Senator Charles Grassley, Senate Hearing 111-1115, Investigating and
Prosecuting Financial Fraud after the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act, (111th Congress, 2nd
Session Sep. 22, 2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg71990/html/
CHRG-111shrg71990.htm.
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establish that they did so with the requisite criminal intent, or mens rea.2 Yet,
not a single high-level Wall Street executive has been prosecuted criminally for
their role in bringing about the worst crisis since the Great Depression.3 In the
rather blunt words of a former Senate investigator: “Everything’s fucked up, and
nobody goes to jail.”4
This Note argues that the current enforcement framework, whereby cozy fi-
nancial regulators and prosecutors are content with levying civil fines against
financial institutions and allowing the bad actors therein to remain insulated, is
insufficient. A key underlying premise throughout this Note is that the identifi-
cation and prosecution of bad actors in the financial markets are “vital to the
American economic engine.”5 This premise is especially true at this juncture in
American history where, due to the interconnectedness and complexity of mod-
ern finance, a single harm or instance of wrongdoing can destabilize the entire
global market.6
This Note, therefore, suggests that prosecutors overseeing the financial ser-
vices industry should increasingly rely on whistleblowers from within a partic-
ular institution or the industry as a whole in order to establish the seemingly
elusive element of criminal intent in these cases of alleged individual criminal
financial wrongdoing.
A.1 A Brief History of the 2008 Financial Crisis
The 2008 Financial Crisis (“The Crisis”) ultimately led to a four-year global
“Great Recession” and resulted in sovereign debt crises for many nations, in-
cluding Greece.7 On the whole, the global economy has since recovered; gross
domestic product (GDP) and unemployment rates have returned to pre-Crisis, or
higher, levels. The Dow Jones Industrial Average, a major composite index and
indicator of economic health in the United States, is currently trading north of
$18,000. The index had peaked at just over $14,000 pre-Crisis. The current un-
employment rate in the United States is under 6%, one percentage point higher
than its pre-Crisis average of less than 5%.8 Many Americans—and foreigners
for that matter—however, are still undeniably feeling the effects of the Crisis and
2 Mens rea is defined as “[t]he state of mind that the prosecution, to secure a conviction, must
prove that a defendant had when committing a crime.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).
3 Jon Hilsenrath, Serena Ng & Damian Paletta, Worst Crisis Since ‘30s, With No End Yet in
Sight, Wall St. J., Sept. 18, 2008, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122169431617549947.
4 Matt Taibbi, Why Isn’t Wall Street in Jail, Rolling Stone, Feb. 16, 2011, http://www.
rollingstone.com/politics/news/why-isnt-wall-street-in-jail-20110216.
5 Samuel W. Buell,What is Securities Fraud? 61 Duke L. J. 511, 573 (2011).
6 Sonny Eckhart, Symposium: Citizen Employees: Whistleblowers and Other Employees Acting
in the Public Interest: Postconference Reflector: A Nudged Solution to Securities Fraud, 54 S. Tex.
L. Rev. 81, 87 (2012).
7 See generally Andrew Ross Sorkin, Too Big to Fail: The Inside Story of How Wall
Street and Washington Fought to Save the Financial System—and Themselves (Penguin
Books 2010) (for an exhaustive history of the 2008 financial crisis).
8 See Bureau of Labor Statistics; Google Finance as of January 2015.
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subsequent Recession, as their home values, their jobs, their retirement savings,
and their beliefs in the integrity of the financial markets are yet to be restored.9
In its final report to Congress in 2011, the ten-member Financial Crisis In-
quiry Commission (FCIC) put forth the following about the genesis of the 2008
Financial Crisis:
The crisis …was caused by: widespread failures in financial regula-
tion, including the Federal Reserve’s failure to stem the tide of toxic
mortgages; dramatic breakdowns in corporate governance including
too many financial firms acting recklessly and taking on too much
risk; an explosive mix of excessive borrowing and risk by house-
holds and Wall Street that put the financial system on a collision
course with crisis; key policy makers ill prepared for the crisis, lack-
ing a full understanding of the financial system they oversaw; and
systemic breaches in accountability and ethics at all levels.10
This Note will focus primarily on those causes identified by the FCIC that
contemplate the involvement of individual bad actors, namely: irresponsible
risk-taking, fraudulent mortgage and lending practices, and misrepresentations
around increasingly complex products.
Excessive risk-taking was all too prevalent on Wall Street in the decade or
so leading up to the Financial Crisis. It was during this time that sophisticated
Wall Street financiers claimed to have “banish[ed] risk,” when, in fact, they had
simply lost track of it.”11 Investment banks on Wall Street were leveraged up-
wards of 30-to-1 pre-Crisis, meaning they were executing their often risky trad-
ing strategies with borrowed money.12 Indeed, these leverage ratios had ratch-
eted upwards from 2004 to 2008, skyrocketing from about 12-to-1 to 33-to-1,
respectively.13
In regards to fraudulent mortgage and lending practices, these same finan-
cial institutions were approving loans to nearly anyone, with little regard to their
9 See Attorney Gen. Eric. H. Holder, Jr., Remarks on Financial Fraud Prosecutions at NYU
School of Law (Sept. 7, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-
general-holder-remarks-financial-fraud-prosecutions-nyu-school-law (“[E]ven now[,]
the scars of the Great Recession, its lingering impacts, and its echoes throughout our financial sys-
tem are not hard to find.”); see also William R. Emmons & Bryan J. Noeth, Household Financial
Stability: Who Suffered the Most from the Crisis?, The Reg’l Economist, July 2012, at 11 (finding
that between 2007 and 2009, household wealth declined by almost $17 trillion when adjusted for
inflation).
10 Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of
the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the
United States at xvii–xxii (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/
GPO-FCIC.pdf.
11 The Origins of the Financial Crisis, The Economist (Sep. 7, 2013), http://www.economist.
com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-still-being-felt-
five-years-article.
12 See William D. Cohan, How We Got the Crash Wrong, The Atlantic (June
2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/06/how-we-got-the-crash-
wrong/308984/ (defining leverage as the ratio of debt or assets to equity).
13 Id.
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creditworthiness. As a result, many of the individual consumers obtaining these
loans were “subprime” borrowers, who were, unsurprisingly, unable to repay
their debt upon maturity.14 Such subprime loans then were pooled consciously
with loans of somewhat higher quality to disguise their risk. These pooled loans
then were securitized into collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), asset backed
securities (ABS), mortgage backed securities (MBS), and credit default swaps
(CDS) by creative financial engineers at the investment banks.15 These highly
complex derivative products were blessed by self-interested rating agencies, too
sophisticated for the majority of industry regulators to fully comprehend, and
marketed and sold to less than sophisticated buyers with less than sufficient dis-
closures.16
As the Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations uncovered in a
hearing on the role of investment banks in the Crisis, the banks selling these
products often made misrepresentations about them to clients, or worse, played
both sides of the deal.17 Using mighty Goldman Sachs as a case study, Senator
Carl Levin and Senator Tom Coburn determined that the investment bank had
marketed several deals to its clients as good or long investments while simulta-
neously shorting such investments.18 The Committee specifically exposed Gold-
man Sachs’ now infamous Abacus collateralized debt obligation, where Gold-
man let a hedge fund that was shorting, or betting against, the CDO nonetheless
cherry-pick the underlying assets that would be included in the CDO. The in-
vestment bank then marketed the CDO to several of its other clients as a good
investment. In a rather terse exchange between Senator Carl Levin and Goldman
Sachs’ CEO, Lloyd Blankfein, Senator Levin asked: “Do you think they know
that you think something is a piece of crap when you sell it to them and then
bet against it? You think they know that?”19 Such questionable behavior caused
one investigative reporter to famously refer to the investment bank as a “great
vampire squid” that was “wrapped around the face of humanity, relentlessly
jamming its blood funnel into anything that smells like money.”20
Fraud and financial misrepresentations—in addition to greed andmoral lapses,
which are not necessarily illegal21—were clearly rampant on Wall Street in the
run up to the 2008 Financial Crisis. In its final lengthy presentation to Congress,
the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission used a variant of the word fraud over a
hundred and fifty times in describing what led to the Financial Crisis, before con-
cluding “that there was a ‘systemic breakdown,’ not just in accountability, but
14 Origins, supra note 11.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Sen. Carl Levin, Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: The Role of Investment Banks (April




20 Matt Taibbi, The Great American Bubble Machine, Rolling Stone (April 5, 2010), http:
//www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-great-american-bubble-machine-20100405.
21 Editorial, No Crime, No Punishment, N. Y. Times (Aug. 25 2012) http://nyti.ms/PEQj5U.
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also in ethical behavior.”22 In light of the culture on Wall Street pre-Crisis, it is
readily apparent that many executives committed criminal conduct that was ex-
pressly prohibited by the federal securities laws. Therefore, it should have been
relatively easy for prosecutors to establish the actus reus element of financial
crimes.23 The heavy lifting for prosecutors would come in the way of proving
these Wall Street executives acted with the accompanying element of mens rea
by establishing the executives intentionally, or at least knowingly, committed
the particular wrongful act.
The primary fraud enforcement provision of the federal securities laws is Rule
10b-5 under Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.24 When the rule
initially was presented to him in the early 1940s, SEC Commissioner Sumner
Pike approved the enforcement mechanism by quipping, “Well, we are against
fraud aren’t we?”25 Indeed, Rule 10b-5 explicitly prohibits: (1) devices, schemes,
or artifices to defraud, (2) false statements or omissions of material facts, and
(3) acts, practices, or courses of business that operate as frauds or deceits, in
connection with the purchase or of sale of a security.26 The rule has expansive
powers and has been used broadly by industry regulators and prosecutors over
the past seventy-five years to combat fraud.
In the course of investigating various Wall Street actors, the Securities and
Exchange Commission can, in its discretion, make a criminal referral to the De-
partment of Justice (“DOJ” or “Justice”) when it suspects intentional, or willful,
fraud under any of the three prongs of Rule 10b-5.27 The Justice Department
then conducts a parallel criminal investigation and can seek restitution, fines, or
imprisonment of the individual at the focus of the investigation.28 Although the
DOJ does not have to prove reliance, damages, or loss causation, it does have
to establish that the individual acted with scienter, or mens rea.29 Regarding the
requisite scienter in securities fraud cases, the Court in United States v. Teyibo30
held that the government must prove that the defendant “participated in the
scheme to defraud knowingly, willfully and with intent to defraud.”31
When investigated and prosecuted effectively, a criminal fraud conviction is
22 See Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Pros-
ecuted?, N.Y. Rev. of Books (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/
2014/jan/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/.
23 Actus reus is defined as “[t]he wrongful deed that comprises the physical components of a
crime and that generally must be coupled withmens rea to establish criminal liability.” Black’s Law
Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).
24 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§78a–78pp (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
25 Milton Freeman, Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. Law 793,
922 (1967).
26 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5.
27 JonathanM. Karpoff, et al., The Legal Penalties for FinancialMisrepresentation (May 2, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript), (http://ssrn.com/abstract=933333); see also Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 §32, 15 U.S.C. §§78a–78pp.
28 Id.
29 United States v. Teyibo, 877 F. Supp 846, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
30 Id. at 861.
31 Id.; see also L. Sand, T. Siffert, W. Loughlin and S. Reiss, Modern Federal Jury Instruc-
tions: Criminal 57 (1994).
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one of the most “serious, costly, stigmatizing, and punitive forms of liability im-
posed on actors in modern corporations and financial markets.”32 It is likely that
fraud convictions related to the 2008 Financial Crisis would have the profound
impact on improving norms, behavior, and attitudes in the financial industry.33
During and following the Crisis, many justifiably felt the industry was desper-
ately in need of such a reshaping. Yet, the powerful liability-attaching, deterrent
mechanism that is a fraud conviction has not been used at all to go after Wall
Street executives, despite the fact that their conduct was particularly blamewor-
thy in light of the Crisis it precipitated. Indeed, when one asks how many of the
executives who allegedly engaged in fraudulent behavior in the years leading up
to and during the Financial Crisis were criminally prosecuted and put in jail, the
answer is a troubling zero.
B Current Regulatory Framework Not Working
Following the 2008 Financial Crisis, “Main Street” was justifiably angered and
wanted to see prosecutions. Industry regulators and federal prosecutors smelled
blood and proclaimed they would hold those accountable responsible. On this
point, the former head of the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division, Lanny
Breuer, stated the following at a Senate Oversight hearing in 2010:
The Department [of Justice] has re-evaluated the manner in which
it investigates financial fraud, and as a result, we have significantly
heightened our enforcement efforts. We have forged even closer part-
nerships with the many law enforcement and regulatory agencies
that are focused on fighting fraud, and we have redoubled our ef-
forts to send a strong deterrent message to would-be fraudsters by
vigorously prosecuting these criminals and sending them to jail.34
These groups also had the support of legislators in Washington. In 2009,
Congress passed, and President Obama signed into law, the Fraud Enforcement
Recovery Act, known as FERA. FERA appropriated an additional $165 mil-
lion in federal funds to investigators and prosecutors with the directive to go
after those on Wall Street who engaged in fraud connected to the Financial Cri-
sis.35 At the time, Senator Ted Kaufman insisted, “the men and women who
duped would-be home owners, who defrauded the American investor, need to
[be] identified, prosecuted, convicted and thrown in jail.”36 Such grand pos-
32 Buell, supra note 5, at 521.
33 Id. at 574.
34 Investigating and Prosecuting Financial Fraud after the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act,
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 5–6 (2010) (statement of Lanny Breuer, Head,
Department of Justice Criminal Division).
35 Jeff Connaughton, “Financial Crisis and Financial Crimes” Address at the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York (Nov. 2, 2010).
36 Congressional Record-Senate, Vol. 155, Pt. 4, 4331, 4342 (111th Congress, 1st Session
Feb. 23, 2009) (quoting Judiciary Committee Chairman Sen. Patrick Leahy “I want to see people
who have committed such fraud and the havoc, it’s caused this country—frankly, I want to see them
go to jail”).
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turing by prosecutors and public encouragement by legislators produced min-
imal results, however. Not a single high-level Wall Street executive has been
successfully criminally prosecuted for their role in precipitating the Financial
Crisis.37 This is true despite the fact that many traders and bankers on Wall
Street—the alleged perpetrators—worried “they could be held criminally liable
for fraud…and…expected investigations and at least some prosecutions.”38
In June of 2008, just a few short months before the failure of the investment
bank Lehman Brothers, the Department of Justice criminally charged two former
executives of the now-defunct investment bank Bear Stearns with securities fraud
for their alleged participation in creating the housing bubble.39 These were to
be the government’s first of many successful criminal convictions relating to the
2008 Financial Crisis. A year later, however, a jury found the two former Bear
Stearns executives not guilty and acquitted them of the criminal charges. The
prosecutors working the case had struggled to convince a jury beyond a reason-
able doubt—the burden of proof standard in criminal cases—of the executive’s
mens rea, or “guilty mind” in committing the prohibited criminal conduct.
This early setback had a tremendous effect on the prosecutorial effort at
the Department of Justice. Former New York Governor and Attorney General
Eliot Spitzer stated that as a result of the loss, “there was a definite sense that
Justice backed off and…became timorous when it came to making the cases that
would really have gone to the heart of what did happen in the crisis of ‘08.”40
Following the Bear Stearns loss, risk adverse United States Attorneys were no
longer attracted to the idea of prosecuting white-collar crimes if evidence as to
the defendant’s intentions—their mens rea—was seemingly lacking up front.41
Sadly, such a view would come to dominant Justice’s response to the Financial
Crisis.
Indeed, charges against alleged Financial Crisis precipitators have almost ex-
clusively been brought as civil cases where prosecutors just have to establish
guilt beyond a preponderance of the evidence, as opposed to the stricter criminal
standard of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.42 Under the current prosecutorial
framework, an individual or investment bank that is found to have commit-
ted a violation of the federal securities laws, can avoid admitting their guilt43
37 See Rakoff, supra note 22; see also Taibbi, supra note 4.
38 The Untouchables, PBS Frontline (Jan. 22, 2013), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/untouchables/.
39 United States v. Cioffi, 08-CR-00415, (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
40 Untouchables, supra note 38.
41 Buell, supra note 5, at 572; see also Marian Wang, Why No Financial Crisis Pros-
ecutions? Ex-Justice Official Says It’s Just Too Hard, Pro Publica (Dec. 6, 2011), avail-
able at http://www.propublica.org/article/why-no-financial-crisis-prosecutions-
official-says-its-just-too-hard (quoting a former FBI agent as saying following the loss, the
federal government began to question its “ability to convince a jury that criminality has occurred”
in complex financial cases).
42 JasonM. Breslow, Too Big to Jail: The Top Ten Civil Cases Against the Banks, PBS Frontline
(Jan. 22, 2013), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-economy-
financial-crisis/untouchables/too-big-to-jail-the-top-10-civil-cases-against-
the-banks/.
43 See United States Securities and Exchange Commission v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 752
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and pay a fine to the Justice Department, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, or one of the other relevant authorities tasked with overseeing Wall
Street, such as the New York Department of Financial Services or New York At-
torney General. Some Wall Street commentators are appropriately skeptical of
this arrangement, referring to such civil settlements as “cash for secrecy” deals,
whereby investment banks agree to pay the large fines after a series of secret
negotiations, without the presence of trials or judges.44 Further, following such
a civil settlement, the only thing disclosed to the public is a quasi-official state-
ment of facts, which, some reporters have quipped, “is conveniently devoid of
anything like actual facts.”45
For the large investment banks that dominate Wall Street, such a civil fine is
merely seen as a “mild and modest” cost of doing business46 that the bank can
pass on to its employees and shareholders.47 Indeed, in such cases, a corpora-
tion that has entered a guilty plea may still see its share price rise the very next
day on the New York Stock Exchange.48 Until very recently, such civil enforce-
ment measures against financial institutions were the exception, not the rule, and
“prosecutions of companies without simultaneous prosecutions of their manage-
rial agents were even rarer.”49 The Department of Justice has nonetheless made
these civil enforcement actions the focus of their response to the 2008 Finan-
cial Crisis. In doing so, the DOJ has relied heavily on the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act, known as “FIRREA.” FIRREA, which
was passed shortly after the Savings and Loan Crises of the 1980s, essentially
F.3d 285 (2d. Cir. 2014)(overturning Judge Rakoff’s Southern District of New York opinion that the
“no admit, no deny” policy employed by the SEC for civil settlements was inappropriate); see also
Chair Mary Jo White’s Speech to the Council of Institutional Investors (Chicago, Sep. 26, 2013),
available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539841202 (stating “To re-
iterate, no-admit-no-deny settlements are a very important tool in our enforcement arsenal that we
will continue to use when we believe it is in public interest to do so. In other cases, we will be requir-
ing admissions. These decisions are for us to make within our discretion, not decisions for a court
to make.”).
44 SeeMatt Taibbi, The $9 BillionWitness: Meet JPMorgan’s Worst Nightmare, Rolling Stone
(Nov. 6, 2014).
45 Id.
46 See Securities Exchange Commission v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 827 F.Supp.2d 328,
333–35 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)(Judge Rakoff referring to one such civil fine of $285 million levied against
Citigroup as “a mild and modest cost of doing business” and “pocket change” to any large invest-
ment bank); see alsoWilliam D. Cohan,OnWall Street Whistleblowers, The Financial Times (May
30, 2014) (quoting director Beatrise Edwads of the public-interest law firm Government Account-
ability Project, “Calculate how much money you can make doing ‘x’ or selling ‘y’ before getting
caught at it, and what you think essentially you could settle for, and if what you can make is sub-
stantially more than what you can settle for, then you go forward…It’s a cost-benefit analysis. It
works because nobody’s going to jail. Jail would put a stop to it.”).
47 See Rakoff, supra note 22 (stating that “from a moral standpoint, punishing a company and
its many innocent employees and shareholders for the crimes committed by some unprosecuted
individuals seems contrary to elementary notions of moral responsibility”); see alsoAttorney General
Holder Remarks, supra note 9 (stating that it’s not right for punishment to be borne exclusively by
the company, its employees, and it’s innocent shareholders.”).
48 SeeAttorney General Holder Remarks, supra note 9; see also Taibbi, supra note 44 (illustrating
that following a $13 billion civil settlement with the Department of Justice, JP Morgan’s share price
soared six percent.).
49 Rakoff, supra note 22.
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allows regulators to civilly charge investment banks as having committed fraud
against themselves.50 In the aftermath of the Financial Crisis, the Justice Depart-
ment has used FIRREA to obtain record civil settlements from J. P. Morgan, Cit-
igroup, Bank of America, and many other investment banks.51 This new trend in
Wall Street enforcement is troubling; however, when prosecutors merely go af-
ter the financial institution, the “former executives, who actually committed the
underlying misconduct…are left untouched.”52 Put another way, the proverbial
buck stops nowhere.53
Many commentators, including former Wall Street-focused prosecutors, are
justifiably unsatisfied with this current enforcement framework, whereby prose-
cutors claim that it is too hard to prove the requisitemens rea for a criminal con-
viction and therefore, keep the focus of their efforts in the civil and institutional
arenas.54 It does not have to be this way, however. In addition to the prosecuto-
rial framework advocated by this Note—increased reliance on whistleblowing—
it is worth noting that prosecutors could currently bring criminal cases under
the doctrine of willful blindness or under the strict liability provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Indeed, one way to overcome the difficulty of proving that the alleged bad
actor acted with the requisite criminal intent is by proving they at least acted with
willful blindness, like an ostrich that buries its head in the sand to avoid trouble.
Judge Jed Rakoff, of the Southern District of New York—the federal court that
hears the majority of the cases pertaining to Wall Street—raises the example of
a banker, who, despite growing evidence from the industry that mortgage fraud
is rampant, refuses to ask just how it is that his investment bank’s mortgage
backed securities continue to receive AAA ratings from the rating agencies.55
Judge Rakoff rhetorically posits, “Might it be because he did not want to know
what such inquiries would reveal?”56
As the United States Supreme Court has stated, the “doctrine of willful blind-
ness is well established in criminal law…[C]ourts applying the doctrine of will-
ful blindness hold that defendants cannot escape the reach of these statutes by
deliberately shielding themselves from clear evidence of critical facts that are
strongly suggested by the circumstances.”57 It appears clear that federal prose-
cutors should have at least attempted to criminally charge Wall Street executives
where applicable under this doctrine. There is simply no way that executives
at the various investment banks were completely in the dark regarding the irre-
sponsible risk-taking, fraudulent mortgage and lending practices, and misrepre-
sentations around increasingly complex products individuals within their firms
50 Attorney General Holder Remarks, supra note 9.
51 Id.
52 Rakoff, supra note 22.
53 Attorney General Holder Remarks, supra note 9.
54 See id. (stating that the failure to establish intent or the knowledge of a particular scheme by
a high-ranking executive “has been a source of frustration for the public for a long time.”)
55 Rakoff, supra note 22.
56 Id.
57 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., No.10-6 (U.S. May 31, 2011).
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engaged in. That is, unless they wanted to be in the dark. In the aftermath of
prior crises, more resolute federal prosecutors have asked juries to infer intent
on this basis, especially in complex cases “at least as esoteric as those involved
in the events leading up to the financial crisis.”58
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is another method by which prosecutors could have
held Wall Street executives criminally responsible for their actions in bringing
about the Financial Crisis. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, or “SOX” as it is known
colloquially, was passed after the Enron and WorldCom debacles in the early
twenty-first century with the well-intentioned goal of cleaning up corporate ac-
counting practices. Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a stringent, catch-
all provision that requires chief executive officers and chief financial officers to
certify financial statements prior to their filing with the Securities and Exchange
Commission to ensure that the statements are free of any untrue statements or
omissions of material facts and further, that adequate internal controls around
such information exist.59 Section 1350 of the Act adds teeth to §302, making it
a strict liability, criminal offense for corporate executives to knowingly sign a
false financial statement. Knowingly doing so is punishable by up to ten years
in prison and a fine of up to one million dollars, with punishments increasing
to twenty years and five million dollars if their misconduct is willful.60 The ba-
sic premise behind these provisions of SOX was to “have a criminal statute in
place that would make CEOs and CFOs think twice, think three times before
they signed their names attesting to the accuracy of financial statements or the
viability of internal controls.”61
There is much evidence suggesting thatWall Street executives were well aware
of the “toxicity” of the sub-prime mortgage-backed and asset-backed securities
sold by their firms. In the words of one former investment banker turned Wall
Street commentator, “One damning email after another makes clear [Wall Street
executives] knew some of the mortgages would probably default and that the se-
curities should never have been sold in the first place.”62 Despite their apparent
clear applicability, these provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley have not been used at
all by the Justice Department, the New York Department of Financial Services,
or any other body with criminal authority to prosecute and jail such corporate
executives. This was arguably a missed opportunity.
It is also important to note that the Justice Department’s response to the
individual misconduct that brought about the 2008 Financial Crisis differs sub-
stantially from that of the Department’s response to instances of individual mis-
conduct in prior financial crises. As Judge Rakoff of the federal district court
for the Southern District of New York has noted, comparing current efforts to
those during the Junk Bond Bubble in the 1970s, the Savings and Loan Crisis
of the 1980s and 1990s, and the Accounting Frauds of the 1990s thus reveals a
58 Rakoff, supra note 22.
59 15 U.S.C. §7241 (2002).
60 15 U.S.C. §1350(c)(1)(2) (2002).
61 Prosecuting Wall Street, CBS 60 Minutes (Dec. 05, 2011).
62 See Cohan, supra note 46.
2016 Zales: $22 Trillion Lost, Zero Wall Street Executives Jailed 177
troubling picture.63 The progenitors of the fraud in the Junk Bond Bubble in the
1970s, such as Michael Miliken, were criminally prosecuted.64 The same is true
for the Savings and Loan Crisis of the 1980s, where special government task
forces and prosecutors put more than eight hundred bank officials in jail, many
of them top executives.65 The prosecutorial result was similar with the account-
ing fraud scandals that characterized the early 2000s. Those individuals allegedly
responsible were prosecuted and found guilty; indeed, formerly well-respected
CEOs, such as Enron’s Jeffrey Skilling and Worldcom’s Bernard Ebbers, were
hauled off to jail.66
The investigation and prosecution of the 2008 Financial Crisis produced
quite a different story, however. As the press has noted, “There were no criminal
referrals from the regulators. No fraud working groups. No national task force.
There has been no effective punishment of the elites here.”67
Rather than taking a note from their predecessors and working to convict
bad actors of criminal fraud or financial misrepresentation, federal prosecutors
have chosen to bring the easier cases. Indeed, they have focused their efforts on
civil cases that have a lower burden of proof and on going after institutions as
opposed to individuals.68 Perhaps the most obvious example of this is the case of
Countrywide Financial’s CEO Angelo Mozilo, who arguably “headed the single
most corrupt subprime mortgage lender in America during the period preceding
the crisis.”69 Indeed, in a 2008 interview with Bloomberg News, Senator Charles
Schumer of New York stated that Countrywide Financial “will come to symbol-
ize what went wrong with housing” in the run up to the Financial Crisis.70
Despite instilling a culture that consciously abandoned loan-underwriting
standards—Mozilo operated under a “fund ’em” philosophy—he was not crim-
inally prosecuted and therefore, received zero jail time.71 Instead, Mozilo was
able to settle a civil suit with the Securities and Exchange Commission by pay-
ing a $67.5 million fine, almost a third of which was covered by his institution,
Countrywide Financial.72 If the amount of the civil fine sounds like a substantial
sum of money, it is worth noting that as the chief executive officer of one of the




67 Gretchen Morgenson & Louis Story, In Financial Crisis, No Prosecution of Top Figures, The
New York Times (Apr. 14, 2011).
68 In recent remarks at NYU School of Law, Attorney General Holder defended this approach,
noting the difficulty in proving intent and knowledge of a fraudulent scheme, and concluding Justice
“cannot bring cases unless, based upon the facts and the law, we believe that we are likely to succeed
in court.” See Attorney General Holder Remarks, supra note 9.
69 Matt Taibbi, Angelo Mozilo, Former Countrywide CEO, Claims He Doesn’t Know What
‘Verified Income’ Is, Rolling Stone (Dec. 28, 2012).
70 Keri Geiger, Tom Schoenberg & Greg Farrell, Countrywide’s Mozilo Said to Face U.S. Suit
Over Loans, Bloomberg News (Aug. 21, 2014).
71 Untouchables, supra note 39 (quoting a Countrywide employee saying ‘fund ‘em’ was “Angelo
Mozilo’s growth strategy for 2006.”)
72 Taibbi, supra note 69.
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nation’s largest mortgage underwriters, Angelo Mozilo made over half a billion
dollars from 2000 to 2008.
In the words of University of San Diego law professor and former Wall Street
derivatives trader Frank Partnoy, the Mozilo case is characteristic of the “dual
nature” of how financial crimes are prosecuted:
We have the Department of Justice, which can put people in jail and
the Securities and Exchange Commission, which can’t. And its sort
of like we have this two-headed monster—one head has some teeth.
The other head has no teeth. And it was the head with no teeth that
went after Angelo Mozilo. So the greatest danger he was in from the
beginning was maybe he’d be gummed to death, but not even that
happened.73
Indeed, shortly after the civil settlement with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, federal prosecutors with the Department of Justice dropped their
criminal investigation and Mozilo was spared a conviction and jail time.74
The response of federal prosecutors to the 2008 Financial Crisis—focusing
on civil prosecutions against institutions as opposed to criminal prosecutions
against individuals—can be fairly characterized as one of missed opportunity.
While outgoing Attorney General Eric Holder defended the Justice Department’s
response to the Crisis in recent remarks at New York University Law School, he
conceded that criminally prosecuting individual bad actors onWall Street would
have had the threefold effect of increasing accountability, promoting fairness,
and serving as a deterrent.75 Regarding the deterrence effect criminal prosecu-
tions would have had, Attorney General Holder continued:
Few things discourage criminal activity at a firm—or incentivize changes
in corporate behavior—like the prospect of individual decision-makers
being held accountable. A corporation may enter a guilty plea and
still see its stock price rise the next day. But an individual who is
found guilty of a serious fraud crime is most likely going to prison.76
Indeed, levying a civil fine against the financial institution—a separate entity un-
der law—does not have the same deterrent effect as criminally prosecuting those
73 Prosecuting Wall Street, supra note 61.
74 Id.
75 See Attorney General Holder Remarks, supra note 9 (“First, it enhances accountabil-
ity…corporate misconduct must necessarily be committed by flesh-and-blood human beings. So
wherever misconduct occurs within a company, it is essential that we seek to identify the decision-
makers at the company who ought to be held responsible. Second, it promotes fairness—because,
when misconduct is the work of a known bad actor, or a handful of known bad actors, it’s not
right for punishment to be borne exclusively by the company, its employees, and its innocent share-
holders. And finally, it has a powerful deterrent effect…few things discourage criminal activity a
firm—or incentivize changes in corporate behavior—like the prospect of individual decision-makers
being held accountable.”)
76 Id.
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individuals actually responsible for the wrongdoing. In the words of George-
town Law Professor Donald Langevoor, to effectively deter criminal behavior,
“You have to scare the executives, not just the firm.”77
Without this deterrence effect, there has been a perpetuation of Wall Street’s
pre-Crisis culture of greed, zero accountability, and risk-taking. A recent review
of the New York Times and Wall Street Journal details several new instances of
financial misconduct by Wall Street Executives, including the rigging of the Lon-
don Interbank Offered Rates (LIBOR), colluding on foreign exchange (FX) rates
over messaging systems, issuing credit ratings without conducting the proper
diligence, hiding stock options and other forms of compensation from public
disclosure, and undervaluing portfolios.78
As the statute of limitations on many of the would-be crimes from the Fi-
nancial Crisis toll or continue to tick down,79 it has become quite evident that
“the failure of the government to bring to justice those responsible for such
colossal fraud bespeaks weaknesses in our prosecutorial system that need to be
addressed.”80 Moreover, the total absence of criminal prosecutions related to the
Crisis is “consistent with what many people were worried about during the cri-
sis, that different rules would be applied to different players. It goes to the whole
perception that Wall Street was taken care of, and Main Street was not.”81
This Note seeks to therefore advocate for the prosecutorial framework that
should have been used by regulators and prosecutors in the aftermath of the
most recent financial crisis and can be used going forward. This new framework
allows prosecutors to overcome the difficulty of proving criminal intent in vi-
olations of the federal securities laws and focus once again on the individual
by encouraging prosecutors to work hand in hand with—and indeed rely on—
whistleblowers to establish the element ofmens rea. Such a framework will hold
accountable those responsible for subsequent crises and succeed in having a pro-
found deterrent effect on prospective bad actors. Such effects should have arisen
from criminal prosecutions following the 2008 Financial Crisis.
77 Jonathan Berr, Why So Few Sketchy Bankers are Behind Bars, CBS Money Watch (Oct. 1,
2014) (Georgetown Law Professor Donald Langevoor speaking about the “common impression”).
78 See generally Various, Deal Book New York Times (2014); Various, Wall Street Journal
(2014).
79 See No Crime, No Punishment, supra note 21 (stating that the statute of limitations is generally
five years for securities fraud and most other federal offenses); see also Berr, supra note 77 (quoting
Cornell Law School professor Robert C. Hockett that there would “be arguments in court over
when DOJ ‘should’ have known about the wrongs having occurred (since that’s when the clock
starts running)”); see also Taibbi, supra note 44 (quoting former prosecutor and New York Attorney
General Eliot Spitzer, “A conspiratorial way of looking at it would be to say the state waited far too
long to look at these cases and is now taking its sweet time investigating, while the last statutes of
limitations run out.”).
80 Rakoff, supra note 22.
81 Morgenson, supra note 67 (quoting University of Pennsylvania Law Professor David A. Skeel);
see also Matt Taibbi, The People v. Goldman Sachs, Rolling Stone, May 26, 2011, at 41 (“[T]he
mountain of evidence collected against Goldman by…investigators—details of gross, baldfaced
fraud delivered up in such quantities as to almost serve as a kind of sarcastic challenge to the curiously
impassive Justice Department—stands as the most important symbol of Wall Street’s aristocratic im-
punity and prosecutorial immunity produced since the crash of 2008.”).
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C Whistleblowing as Solution to Insufficient Prosecutorial
Framework
As outgoing Attorney General Eric Holder has noted:
Since no financial fraud case is prosecutable unless we have sufficient
evidence of intent, [prosecutors] should seek to better equip investi-
gators to obtain this often-elusive evidence. This means, among other
things, thinking creatively about ways to…encourage whistleblow-
ers at financial firms to come forward.82
This sentiment lays the foundation for the prosecutorial framework advocated
by this Note: prosecutors need to start working extensively—indeed, relying
on—whistleblowers to establish the so-called “elusive” element of intent in crim-
inally prosecuting potential violators of the federal securities laws. In doing so,
Wall Street prosecutors will be able to conduct the mens rea inquiry they have
been avoiding. Such an inquiry is the only method to “separate the malign from
the benign,”83 and ensure investigations into alleged financial wrongdoing stay
in the criminal arena where appropriate.
According to Blacks Law Dictionary, a whistleblower is an employee who
reports “illegal or wrongful activities of his employer or fellow employees.”84 As
far as Wall Street’s cop, the Securities and Exchange Commission, is concerned,
a whistleblower is “any individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting
jointly who provide, information relating to a violation of the securities laws to
the Commission.”85
United States President Barack Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform andConsumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) into law in 2010with the
lofty goal of preventing future financial crises. Among other things, the Dodd-
Frank amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by adding Section 21F, enti-
tled “Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection.” This Section seeks to
do exactly that: financially incentivize whistleblowers to report wrongdoing and
also protect them from retaliation from their employer once they do make such
a report. In doing so, Dodd-Frank has dramatically improved the whistleblower
regime in the United States. The financial incentive, or bounty, component of
Dodd-Frank fills a void that was missing from previous whistleblower statutes,
such as those provided in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.86 To quote Paul Kanjorski,
the former Congressman from Pennsylvania, the goal of the statute was to “put
82 Attorney General Holder Remarks, supra note 10; see alsoCohan, supra note 47 (quoting Eliot
Spitzer: “Very few prosecutors would claim that they could make great cases without individuals on
the inside…We cannotmake the complicated cases or begin to see the difficulties there without people
who come forward to discuss what is going on that￿s improper. So we desperately need them and
we’re going to continue to apply pressure to ensure that Wall Street and the other major institutions
live by the rules.”).
83 Buell, supra note 5.
84 Black’s Law Dictionary 1734 (9th ed. 2009).
85 15 U.S.C.S. §78u–6(a)(6)
86 M. Thomas Arnold, “It’s Déjà vu All Over Again”: Using Bounty Hunters to Leverage Gate-
keeper Duties, 45 Tulsa L. Rev. 419, 460 (2010).
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more cops on the beat,” by allowing the Securities and Exchange Commission
“to pay bounties to whistleblowers whose tips result in catching fraudsters.”87
In respect to number of tips received, the Act’s bounty scheme seems to be work-
ing thus far. Prior to Dodd-Frank, the Securities and Exchange Commission was
receiving only around two-dozen “high-value” tips per year from whistleblow-
ers regarding financial wrongdoing; in the first six months after Dodd-Frank was
signed into law, the SEC was averaging the receipt of one to two high-high value
tips per day.88
Section 922 of Dodd-Frank specifically states that “the Commission…shall
pay an award or awards to 1 or more whistleblowers who voluntarily provided
original information89 to the Commission that led to the successful enforcement
of the covered judicial or administrative action, or related action,” resulting in
“monetary sanctions exceeding $1 million.”90 The award the SEC “shall pay”
(meaning such a payment is mandatory) to whistleblowers is set at ten to thirty
percent of the collected monetary sanctions;91 a considerable sum of money con-
sidering the average amount recovered by the SEC in an enforcement proceeding
is tens of millions of dollars.92 “Related actions,” as defined by the Act, impor-
tantly include Department of Justice and State Attorney General criminal ac-
tions.93 The takeaway here is that although a whistleblower may initially come
forward to assist the SEC in its civil enforcement investigation, they are also in-
centivized to work with the criminal enforcement authorities, such as the DOJ.
In other industries, such financial incentives have been proven effective in
motivating whistleblowers to detect and report fraud to the relevant authorities.
In a recent study, researchers at the University of Toronto found that the pres-
ence of a “strong monetary incentive to blow the whistle does motivate people
to come forward.”94 Yet there are some in government that believe the reward
amounts currently available to prospective whistleblowers may not be enough
to induce current Wall Streeters to actually take the risk of blowing the whistle.
This is especially true in light of the fact that in 2013, the financial industry’s
collective bonus pool was north of $26 billion and median executive pay was
$15 million.95 In recent remarks, Attorney General Holder advocated increas-
ing financial incentives for individual cooperation to “significantly improve the
Justice Department’s ability to gather evidence of wrongdoing while complex
financial crimes are still in progress—making it easier to complete investigations
87 Industry Perspectives on the Obama Administration’s Financial Regulatory Reform Proposals:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Fin. Serv., 111th Cong. 62 (2009).
88 Dave Clarke, SEC Gets More Whistleblower Tips, Reuters (Feb. 4, 2011).
89 “Original information” is defined by the statute as information derived from the “independent
knowledge or analysis of a whistleblower…not known to the [SEC] from any other source.” See
Dodd-Frank Act §922, 15 U.S.C.S. §78u–6(a)(3).
90 Id. at §78u–6.
91 Id. at §78u–6(b)(1).
92 www.sec.gov.
93 Dodd-Frank Act §922, 15 U.S.C.S. §78u–6(a)(5) & (b)(1).
94 Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. Fin. 2213, 2215
(2010).
95 Attorney General Holder Remarks, supra note 9.
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and to stop misconduct before it becomes so widespread that it foments the next
crisis.”96
The decision by a Wall Street employee to become a whistleblower has two
profound effects: “first, increased whistleblowing raises the likelihood of de-
tection, thus reducing the opportunity to commit fraud. Second, the threat of
whistleblowing—and the public condemnation it triggers—makes rationaliza-
tion more difficult.”97 Whistleblowing is seen as one of the most effective ways
of detecting fraud.98 Indeed, more than forty percent of fraud detection occurs as
a result of tips from whistleblowers.99 Thus, the role of whistleblowing in fraud
detection should not be underestimated: in their recent study at the University
of Toronto, researchers revealed that the SEC itself uncovered just seven percent
of 216 major financial fraud scandals between 1996 and 2004.100
One of the main reasons that whistleblowing has been so successful in root-
ing out instances of fraud is that whistleblowers are often insiders with access to
information sources not otherwise easily available to prosecutors.101 The newly
created Office of the Whistleblower at the Securities and Exchange Commission
states, “Through their knowledge of the circumstances and individuals involved,
whistleblowers can help the Commission identify possible fraud and other vio-
lations much earlier than might otherwise have been possible…allow[ing] the
Commission to…hold accountable those responsible for unlawful conduct.”102
In the financial fraud context, these insiders also often have the financial and
accounting training and acumen that allow them to “comprehend, synthesize,
and evaluate” information that directly or indirectly points to fraud.103 This
financial know-how allows whistleblowers within financial institutions to deci-
pher between transactions that appear criminally fraudulent and those that are
just overly complex, yet lawful.
D “Unheard Whistleblowing” as Missed Opportunities
An often providedmotivation as to whywhistleblowers come forward is “the de-
sire to correct the wrongdoing which is harming the interests of the organization
itself, the consumers, the co-workers and the society at large.”104 If the foregoing
rationale is indeed true, then it follows that many Wall Street employees should
96 Id.
97 Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall Street by
the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 73, 108 (2012).
98 Id. at 108.
99 Ass’n of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2010 Report to the Nations, available at http://www.
acfe.com/rttn-highlights.aspx.
100 Dyck, supra note 94, at 2213–14 (2010); see also Rapp, supra note 97, at 107 (stating that
“while the legal and regulatory environment is predicated on the notion that regulators will detect
fraud, there is very little support for this position.”).
101 Rapp, supra note 97, at 108.
102 SEC Office of the Whistleblower, www.sec.gov/whistleblower.
103 Rapp, supra note 97, at 109.
104 Siddhartha Dasgupta & Ankit Kesharwani, Whistleblowing: A Survey of Literature, 9 IUP J.
Corp. Governance 57, 62 (2010).
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have blown their respective whistles during the Financial Crisis and blown them
loudly. Indeed, many did.105 Unfortunately, industry regulators and prosecutors
did not always listen to them nor work with them to the extent advocated by
this Note. The shortcoming was therefore not that whistleblowers were “reti-
cent to complain,” but rather that they were “not getting the response” which
they should have from regulators and prosecutors.106
When given appropriate attention, whistleblowers can essentially hold “Wall
Street’s collective feet to the fire by exposing wrongdoing when it occurs.”107 If
prosecutors had listened to and relied on these would-be Wall Street whistle-
blowers, the story of the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis would have un-
doubtedly included a final chapter detailing the criminal prosecutions and sub-
sequent jailings of several Wall Street executives. This Note will now explore
a few instances in which Wall Street whistleblowers attempted to do the right
thing, but were either not listened to, or not utilized to their full potential by
regulators and prosecutors. This Note will refer to such instances as “unheard
whistleblowing.”
The first illustrative case of “unheardwhistleblowing” is that ofOliver Budde,
a former legal adviser with the now-defunct investment bank, Lehman Broth-
ers.108 During his time with the bank, Budde noticed Lehman was failing to
disclose the sizable unvested stock options it had granted to its Chairman and
CEO, Dick Fuld, as part of his compensation package. Despite Budde’s inter-
nal protests, the brass at Lehman Brothers refused to disclose the grants in their
annual filings and chose instead to rely on a small loophole that arguably al-
lowed them to skirt the disclosure requirements of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.109
Not wanting to become complicit in Lehman’s scheme, Budde resigned from
the investment bank in 2005. A few years later, however, the SEC closed the
disclosure loophole Lehman Brothers had been exploiting. Budde recalls think-
ing at the time, “Now they’re going to have to disclose these awards…[the] s***
that had been bothering me for years was now at least out in the open.”110 When
Budde opened the March 2008 proxy Lehman Brothers filed with the SEC, he
was appalled to see the investment bank was still hiding Dick Fuld’s stock op-
tions, to the tune of $264 million.111 Budde decided that he had seen enough;
105 See Capital Markets Regulatory Reform: Strengthening Investor Protection, Enhancing Over-
sight of Private Pools of Capital, and Creating a National Insurance Office: Hearing before the H.
Comm. On Fin. Serv., 111th Cong. 84 (2009) (Texas Securities Commissioner and President of the
North American Securities Association noting that the SEC receives close to 750,000 tips a year
and stating that “the problem isn’t that people were coming to the Securities Exchange Commis-
sion…but that they were ignoring them or at least not making good determinations with regard to
those complaints that really needed to be followed up on.”).
106 Id.
107 Cohan, supra note 46.
108 Id.
109 See id. (the loophole, Budde states, has to do with the vesting process of the “restricted stock
units.” If the process is tied to a benchmark—return on equity, share price, etc.—then the value of
the stock options does not have to be disclosed until that benchmark is reached.).
110 Id.
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it was time to the blow the whistle on his former employer. He contacted the
Securities and Exchange Commission five times between April and September
of 2008 (the month Lehman collapsed), outlining Lehman’s scheme of nondis-
closure, naming names, and providing the calculated amounts of Fuld’s hidden
compensation. Lehman’s house of cards came crashing down in September of
2008. As of May 2014, Oliver Budde still had not heard from anyone at the
SEC about his allegations.112
The conscious decision not to disclose such clearly material information to
investors via filings with the SEC appears to be a clear violation of several federal
securities laws, including §302 of SOX (discussed supra). If the SEC listened to
Budde, they would have had a much easier time assessing themens rea, or willful
intent, of these bad actors, so as to exercise their discretion in deciding whether
to make a criminal referral to DOJ. Indeed, had Oliver Budde’s whistleblow-
ing been heard and acted upon, prosecutors may have been able to criminally
prosecute the Lehman Brothers’s executives responsible for failing to make such
disclosures.
The second case of “unheard whistleblowing” concerns Alayne Fleischmann,
a former securities lawyer with the investment bank J. P. Morgan. Fleischmann
claims to have uncovered a “massive criminal securities fraud” within the bank’s
mortgage group in the years leading up to the Financial Crisis.113 As a transac-
tion manager, it was Fleischmann’s job to quality check the thousands of mort-
gages J. P. Morgan was buying, pooling, and securitizing.
During her tenure, Fleischmann was asked to review a $900 million package
of home loans. In doing so, she discovered that around forty percent of the loans
were based on overstated annual incomes; one of the more incredible examples
involved a manicurist making $117,000 per year from that job alone.114 Several
senior sales and diligence executives ultimately forced more junior diligence em-
ployees to mark such preposterous incomes as reasonable, paving the way for
the deal’s error rate to fall from an unacceptable forty percent to a much more
palatable ten percent. As the investment bank’s traders prepared to market and
sell these high-risk loans as low-risk securities, Fleishmann knew she had to act.
She confronted the senior executives, arguing: “You can’t securitize these loans
without special disclosure about what’s wrong with them.”115
From Fleishmann’s story, it appears clear that executives at J. P. Morgan
were selling products they knew were full of subprime, inaccurate loans, with-
out making the necessary disclosures.116 Such behavior is in direct violation of
several federal securities laws and is potentially criminal, if these executives, like
those at Lehman Brothers, acted willfully. At least one press account reported
that despite Fleishmann’s attempts to volunteer information to the Securities
and Exchange Commission and the Department of Justice, the DOJ’s “politi-
cal wing” led by Attorney General Holder was more interested in using her not
112 Id.
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yet obtained evidence as a “bargaining chip” to extract a larger civil settlement
from J. P. Morgan.117 The Justice Department ultimately settled the case with J.
P. Morgan, civilly and out of court, for what was hailed by the U.S. Justice De-
partment as a “record $13 billion settlement.”118 Following the civil settlement,
the same press account reports that prosecutors told Fleishmann they would
be in touch shortly to seek her help in building their supplementary criminal
case against the bank. Despite these assurances, the Department of Justice never
contacted Fleischmann again. The individuals at J. P. Morgan who potentially
engaged in mortgage fraud were never held criminally accountable. In the words
of Fleischmann, “I guess I was just a trusting person…I kept hoping.”119 Unable
to make any headway with federal prosecutors, Fleishmann ultimately turned to
media outlets to tell her story.120
A third case of unheard whistleblowing concerns Eileen Foster, formerly of
Countrywide Financial (the case against Angelo Mozilo, Countrywide’s CEO is
discussed supra). Foster was an executive vice president in charge of fraud inves-
tigations. Countrywide was the largest mortgage lender in the country during the
Financial Crisis and the loans it made were among the most subprime, with “a
third ending up in foreclosure or default, many because of mortgage fraud.”121
Thus, her job arguably kept her very busy. In a televised interview with CBS’s
60Minutes, Foster stated that the fraud she witnessed while employed by Coun-
trywide appeared “systemic.”122 In conducting an internal investigation of the
lender’s Boston office, Foster found evidence—in the form of shredded paper in
recycling bins—that loan officers were “forging and manipulating borrowers’
income and asset statements to help them get loans they weren’t qualified for
and couldn’t afford.”123
Foster attempted to blow the whistle on these types of ‘fund ‘em’ lending
practices, but has never been contacted for information by the Justice Depart-
ment.124 When asked by 60 Minutes’s Steve Kroft if she believed there were
people at Countrywide who had committed crimes and belonged behind bars,
Foster solemnly, yet unwaveringly, answered “Yes.”125 Foster continued that she
would name names to a grand jury, if asked. As discussed infra, the Justice De-
partment has not pursued a single criminal case against mortgage executives at
Countrywide, settling instead to bring a civil case against Countrywide’s CEO
Angelo Mozilo. If Foster’s whistleblowing had in fact been heard by the DOJ,
the outcome might well have been different; such information could have served
117 Id.; See also Laurie Asseo & Tom Schoenberg, JP Morgan Employee Said to Be Cooperating
in RMBS Probe, Bloomberg News, Oct. 1, 2013; Devlin Barrett, J. P. Morgan Insider Helps U.S.
in Probe, Wall St. J., Sep. 30, 2013.
118 Tom Schoenberg, et al., JP Morgan Reaches Record $13 Billion Mortgage Settlement,
Bloomberg News, Nov. 19, 2013.
119 Taibbi, supra note 44.
120 Id.
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as a very strong basis for starting a criminal investigation.126
Finally, it is worth pointing out that even in the rare case of a successful
criminal prosecution—albeit one unrelated to the causes of the 2008 Finan-
cial Crisis—“unheard whistleblowing” by regulators and prosecutors was still
present. The extensive Ponzi scheme orchestrated by Bernie Madoff ultimately
came crashing down in 2008 only after Madoff’s sons, to whom he had con-
fided, informed prosecutors of the fraud.127 Madoff confessed to his fraud, was
successfully prosecuted, and is currently serving a one-hundred-and-fifty year
sentence in federal prison.
Yet, a whistleblower by the name of Harry Markopolos had tried to bring
the fraud to the attention of Wall Street regulators for nearly ten years prior
to the fraud’s unraveling in 2008.128 Markopolos testified that if the Securities
and Exchange Commission acted when he initially—and repeatedly—contacted
them with credible warnings, losses to investors could have been capped at be-
tween $3 and $7 billion, as opposed to $50 billion.129 Markopolos identifies the
failure of the Commission to listen to his whistleblowing as a “tragedy of epic
proportions.”130
The above examples of “unheard whistleblowing” provide just a glimpse
into what was going on at several of the biggest investment houses on Wall
Street in the years leading up to and during the 2008 Financial Crisis. To date,
none of the individuals responsible for bringing about the Financial Crisis have
been criminally charged. If prosecutors had worked with whistleblowers and
seriously relied upon their information concerning alleged criminal activity, the
prosecutorial response to the 2008 Financial Crisis might well have been very
different.
E Conclusion
The current enforcement approach in which prosecutors are content with levy-
ing civil fines against financial institutions while allowing those individuals who
actually engaged in potentially criminal activity to essentially go free, is nothing
more than a convenient way for prosecutors to avoid the harder-to-prove crim-
inal cases while increasing their winning percentage by focusing on the easier
cases.131 The entirety of the Department of Justice’s prosecutorial response to the
126 Id. (quoting University of San Diego Law Professor and former Wall Street derivatives trader
Frank Partnoy, “It certainly sounds like it. And it certainly sounds like a good place to start a criminal
investigation. Usually when the federal government hears about facts like this, they would start
an investigation and they would try to move up the organization to try to figure out whether this
information got up to senior officers, and why it wasn’t disclosed to the public.”).
127 Felicia Smith,Madoff Ponzi Scheme Exposes “The Myth of the Sophisticated Investor”, 40 U.
Balt. L. Rev. 215, 241 (2010).
128 Id.
129 Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Prioritizing Justice: Combating Corporate Crime from Task Force to
Top Priority, 93 Marq. L. Rev. 971, 995 n.126 (2010); see generally Harry Markopolos, No
One Would Listen: A True Financial Thriller (2010).
130 Markopolos, supra note 129.
131 Paula Dywer,Why No Bankers Go to Jail, Bloomberg View Nov 17, 2013, (paraphrasing a
portion of Judge Rakoff’s speech to New York securities lawyers, “law enforcement agencies have
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Financial Crisis boils down to the collection of billions in civil fines, but yielded
criminal guilty pleas from zero individuals and only two investment banks. Given
the cost to the global economy from the Financial Crisis of $22 trillion, this is
an unacceptable result. Wider and more effective use of whistleblowers—many
of whom are lawyers or market participants with significant financial acumen—
might have significantly changed this result.
The often-cited rationale for the enforcement response by regulators and
prosecutors to the Financial Crisis is the fact that it is just too difficult to prove
Wall Street executives acted with the requisite criminal mens rea while violating
the federal securities laws. This Note advocates a new framework in which pros-
ecutors rely on whistleblowers from within the financial institutions where such
individual wrongdoing is occurring or occurred to establish this seemingly elu-
sive element of intent. This new framework is vital, considering that inadequate
enforcement of Wall Street in the early part of the twenty-first century may have
actually “created perverse incentives leading to [the] economic crisis.”132 Relying
on whistleblowers will indeed ensure that “heads roll,” where appropriate.133
had to compete for a shrinking pot of money from Congress, and the best way to do that is by beefing
up their statistics with smaller, easier cases and avoiding the years-long financial fraud probes that
may turn up nothing.”).
132 Ramirez, supra note 129, at 972.
133 Grassley, supra note 1.
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